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Abstract
The goal of this article is to understand some interesting features of
sequences of arbitrage operations, which look relevant to various processes
in Economics and Finances.
In the second part of the paper, analysis of sequences of arbitrages
is reformulated in the linear algebra terms. This admits an elegant ge-
ometric interpretation of the problems under consideration linked to the
asynchronous systems theory. We feel that this interpretation will be use-
ful in understanding more complicated, and more realistic, mathematical
models in economics.
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1
1 Motivation
Consider a mini-economy that involves only three producers. Each producer
produces one of three goods: either Food, or Arms, orMedicine. The economical
activity is reduced to the following three pair-wise barter operations:
Food⇆ Arms, Food⇄Medicine, Arms⇄Medicine.
Suppose that the goods that are produced by each producer are measured in
some units, and the corresponding (strictly positive) exchange rates, rF,A, rFM ,
rAM , are well defined. That is, one unit of Food can be exchanged for rF,A units
of Arms. The rates related to the inverted arrows are reciprocal:
rAF =
1
rFA
, rMF =
1
rFM
, rMA =
1
rAM
. (1.1)
We treat the triplet
(rFA, rFM , rAM ) (1.2)
as the ensemble of principal exchange rates.
We suppose that, prior to a reference time moment 0, each producer knows
only its own exchange rates: Food Producer does not know the value of rAM ,
Arms Producer is unaware of rFM , and Medicine Producer is unaware of rFA.
We are interested in the case when the initial rates are unbalanced in the fol-
lowing sense. By assumption, Food Producer can exchange one unit of Food
for rFA units of Arms. Let us suppose that unbeknownst to him the exchange
rate between Medicine Producer and Arms Producer is such that the Food Pro-
ducer could make a profit by first exchanging one unit of Food for rFM units of
Medicine and then exchanging these for Arms. The inequality which guaran-
tees that Food Producer can take this advantage is that the product rFMrMA
is greater than rFA:
rFM · rMA > rFA. (1.3)
Let us consider the situation when the inequality (1.3) holds, and, after
the reference time moment 0, one of three producers become aware about the
third exchange rate. The evolution of our economy depends on the detail which
producer is the first to discover the information concerning the third exchange
rate. The following three cases are relevant.
Case 1. Food Producer becomes aware of the value of the rate rAM . Therefore,
Food Producer contacts Arms Producer and makes a request to increase the rate
rFA to the new fairer value
rnewFA = rFM · rMA =
rFM
rAM
.
The reciprocal exchange rate rAF is also to be adjusted to the new level:
rnewAF =
1
rnewFA
.
The result is that the principal exchange rates become balanced at the levels:
rnewFA =
rFM
rAM
, rFM , rAM .
2
Case 2. Arms Producer is the first to discover the third exchange rate rFM .
By (1.1), inequality (1.3) may be rewritten as
rFM
rAM
<
1
rAF
,
which is, in turn, equivalent to
rAF · rFM > rAM .
In this case Arms Producer could do better by first exchanging Arms for Food,
and then by exchanging this Food for Medicine. Therefore, Arms Producer
requests adjustment of the rate rAM to the value
rnewAM = rAF · rFM =
rFM
rFA
.
In terms of the principal exchange rates the outcome is that the economy is
adjusted to the following balanced rates:
rFA, rFM , r
new
AM =
rFM
rFA
.
Case 3. Medicine Producer is the first to discover the third exchange rate
rFA. The inequality (1.3) may be rewritten as
rMA · rAF > rMF .
Thus, Medicine Producer requests adjustment of the rate rMF to
rnewMF = rMA · rAF .
In this case the principal exchange rates become balanced at the levels:
rFA, r
new
FM = rFA · rAM , rAM .
After an adjustment of the principal exchange rate (1.2), following revealing
an additional information as described in any one of the cases 1–3 above, the
exchange rates become balanced, and this is the end of evolution of the mini-
economy with three producers. Our motivation to proceed with this project was
to understand possible scenarios of evolution of a similar mini-economy with
four producers.
2 Economical Aspects
2.1 FARM -economy
Consider the economy “FARM” that includes four producers, which produce
Food, Arms, Rellics and Medicine. The economical activity is described by six
pair-wise barter operations:
Food⇆ Arms, Food⇄ Relics, Food⇄Medicine,
Arms⇄ Relics, Arms⇄Medicine, Relics⇄Medicine.
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The goods that are produced by each producer are measured in some units, and
the exchange rates
rFA, rFR, rFM , rAF , rAM , rRM ,
rRF , rRA, rRM , rMF , rMA, rMR
are well defined. The rates related to the inverted arrows are reciprocal:
rAF =
1
rFA
, rRF =
1
rFR
, rMF =
1
rFM
,
rRA =
1
rAF
, rMA =
1
rAM
, rMR =
1
rRM
.
(2.4)
Our economy may be described by the ensemble of six principal exchange rates
R = (rFA, rFR, rFM , rAR, rAM , rRM ) (2.5)
together with relationships (2.4).
The following characterization of balanced exchange rates (2.5) (that is, the
exchange rates, such that no one producer could do better when buying a certain
good through a mediator) is convenient.
Proposition 1. An ensemble
R = (rFA, rFR, rFM , rAR, rAM , rRM )
of the principal exchange rates is balanced if and only if the relationships
rFA · rAR = rFR,
rAR · rRM = rAM , (2.6)
rFA · rAR · rRM = rFM
hold.
Proof. This assertion can be proved by inspection.
2.2 Arbitrages
Let us suppose that initially each producer is aware only of three its own ex-
change rates. For instance, Food Producer knows only the rates
rFA, rFR, rFM . (2.7)
We are interested in the case when the rates
rFA, rFR, rFM , rAR, rAM , rRM
are unbalanced.
For instance, let us suppose that Food Producer can make profit by first,
exchanging one unit of Food for rFM units of Medicine, and then by exchanging
this Medicine for Arms. Mathematically this means that the product rFM ·rMA
is greater than rFA:
rFM · rMA > rFA. (2.8)
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Suppose further, that somebody makes Food Producer aware of the value rAM ,
and, therefore, about the inequality (2.8). Food Producer makes a request that
Arms Producer should increase the exchange rate rFA to the new fairer value
rnewFA = rFM · rMA =
rFM
rAM
.
Along with the adjustment of the exchange rate rFA, the reciprocal rate rAF ,
should be adjusted to
rnewAF =
1
rnewFA
.
We call this procedure FAM -arbitrage, and we use the notation AFAM to rep-
resent it. We denote by RAFAM the ensemble of the new principal exchange
rates:
R
new = RAFAM = (r
new
FA , rFR, rFM , rAR, rAM , rRM ) .
We also use the notation RAFAM in the case when the inequality (2.8) does not
hold. In this case, of course, RAFAM = R, and we say that Arbitrage AFAM is
not active in the later case.
This particular arbitrage is an example of the 24 possible arbitrages listed
in Table 1 in Subsection 2.5.
The principal distinction of the FARM-economy from the economy with only
three producers (as described in Motivation) is that applying a single arbitrage
procedure would not necessarily result in bringing the economy to a balance.
2.3 The Hypothesis
One can apply arbitrages from Table 1 sequentially in any order and to any
initial exchange rates R. A situation that we have in mind is the following.
Suppose that there exists Arbiter who has access to the current ensemble R.
This Arbiter could provide information to the producers in any order he wants,
thus activating the chain (or superposition) of corresponding arbitrages. The
principal question is:
Question 1. How powerful is Arbiter?
The short answer is: Arbiter is surprisingly powerful; possibly, Arbiter is
almighty.
Let us explain at a more formal level what we mean.
For a finite chain of arbitrages A = A1 . . .An, and for a given ensemble R
of initial exchange rates, we denote by
RA = RA1 . . .An (2.9)
the resulting ensemble of principal exchange rates. If R is balanced, then RA =
R for any individual arbitrage, and therefore RA = R for any chain (2.9). If, on
the contrary, R is not balanced, then different chains (2.9) of arbitrages could
result at different balanced or unbalanced ensembles of principal exchange rates.
Denote by S(R) the collection of the sets RA related to all possible sequences
(2.9). Denote also by Sbal(R) the subset of S(R), that includes only balanced
exchange rates ensembles. Our principal observation is the following.
5
For a typical unbalanced ensemble R the set Sbal(R) is unexpectedly reach;
therefore Arbiter, who prescribes a particular sequence of arbitrages, is an un-
expectedly powerful figure.
To avoid cumbersome notations and technical details when providing a rig-
orous formulation of this observation, we concentrate on the simplest example
of the initial ensemble. Let us consider the ensemble
Rα = (α · r¯FA, r¯FR, r¯FM , r¯AR, r¯AM , r¯RM ) , (2.10)
where α > 1 and R¯ is a given balanced ensemble of principal exchange rates. The
ensemble (2.10) is not balanced. A possible origination of the ensemble (2.10)
may be commented as follows. Let us suppose that the underlying balanced
rates
R¯ = (r¯FA, r¯FR, r¯FM , r¯AR, r¯AM , r¯RM ) (2.11)
had been in operation up to a certain reference time moment 0. At this moment
τ the Food Producer has decided to increase his price for Arms by a factor α > 1.
A natural specification of Question 1 is the following:
Question 2. To which balanced rates can Arbiter now bring the FARM-economy?
The possible general structure of elements from the corresponding sets S(Rα)
and Sbal(Rα) is easy to describe. To this end we denote by Tα the collection of
all six-tuples of the form
(αn1 · r¯FA, α
n2 · r¯FR, α
n3 · r¯FM , α
n4 · r¯AR, α
n5 · r¯AM , α
n6 · r¯RM ) , (2.12)
where ni are integer numbers (positive, negative or zero). We also denote by
T balα the subset of elements of Tα, which satisfy the relationships
n1 + n4 = n2,
n4 + n6 = n5, (2.13)
n1 + n4 + n6 = n3.
Proposition 2. The inclusions
S(Rα) ⊂ Tα, (2.14)
and
Sbal(Rα) ⊂ T
bal
α (2.15)
hold.
Proof. The ensemble (2.11) belongs to T . To verify (2.14) we show that the set
Tα is invariant with respect to each arbitrage A from Table 1. This statement
can be checked by inspection. Let us, for instance, apply to a six-tuple (2.12)
the first arbitrage AFAR. Then, by definition, either this arbitrage is inactive,
or it changes the first component αn1 · r¯FA of (2.12) to the new value
rnewFA =
αn2 · r¯FR
αn4 · r¯AR
= αn2−n4 ·
r¯FR
r¯AR
. (2.16)
However, the ensemble R¯ is balanced, and, by the first equation (2.6), r¯FR
r¯AR
=
r¯FA. Therefore, (2.16) implies that the ensemble R¯AFAR also may be repre-
sented in the form (2.12). We have proved the first part of the proposition,
related to the set S(Rα).
The inclusion (2.15) follows now from Proposition 1.
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Proposition 2 in no way answers Question 2. This proposition, however,
allows us to reformulate this question in a more “constructive” form:
Question 3. How big is the set Sbal(Rα), comparing with the collection T
bal
α of
all elements that satisfy restrictions imposed by Proposition 2?
The naive expectation would be that the set Sbal(Rα), is finite and, at least
for the values of α close to 1, all elements of Sbal(Rα) are close to R¯. However,
some geometrical reasons, along with results of extensive numerical experiments
have convinced us that the following statement, describing an unexpected fea-
ture of the power of Arbiter, is true.
Hypothesis 1. The set Sbal(Rα) coincides with T
bal
α :
Sbal(Rα) = T
bal
α . (2.17)
Loosely speaking, this hypothesis means that Arbiter is almighty.
2.4 Observations in Support of Hypothesis 1
Proposition 3. The set Sbal(Rα) includes infinitely many different ensembles.
For instance, it contains the ensembles
(
α · r¯FA, α
1−n · r¯FR, α · r¯FM , α
−n · r¯AR, r¯AM , α
n · r¯RM
)
, (2.18)
where n is an arbitrary positive integer number.
Proof. It is sufficient to prove the “for instance” part. Consider the chain
A = ARFMAFMRAMRAAFRMAMFRARMA.
By Aˆn we denote concatenation of p copies of Aˆ. By inspection, for any
n = 1, 2, . . ., the ensemble (2.18) can be generated by the chain of arbitrages
AnAFMA.
To formulate some further observation in support of the Hypothesis 1 the
following corollary of the second part of Proposition 2 is useful.
Corollary 1. The set T balα coincides with the totality of all six-tuples that may
be written as
(
αi · r¯FA, α
i+j · r¯FR, α
i+j+k · r¯FM , α
j · r¯AR, α
j+k · r¯AM , α
k · r¯RM
)
,
(2.19)
where i, j, k are independent integer numbers.
Thus, using (2.19), the ensembles from T balα may be uniquely coded by
triplets (i, j, k). We measure magnitudes of such triplets by the characteris-
tic
‖(i, j, k)‖ = max{|i|, |j|, |k|}.
We denote by SN (Rα) the subset of S(Rα) which contains the ensembles that
can be generated by chains of arbitrages (2.9) with 1 ≤ n ≤ N . We also denote
by SbalN (Rα) the corresponding subset of SN (Rα).
Hypothesis 1 would follow from the following stronger hypothesis:
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Hypothesis 2. For any α > 1 the set Sbal12ν−1(Rα) contains all balanced ensem-
bles (2.19) whose codes have magnitudes not greater then ν, while Sbal12ν−2(Rα)
contains balanced ensembles with all aforementioned codes, except from the fol-
lowing two: ±(ν, ν, ν).
We have verified numerically the last hypothesis for ν = 1, 2, 3.
In the context of numerical experiments the key question is:
Question 4. How fast the numbers of elements in the sets SN (Rα) and S
bal
N (Rα)
increase in N?
Proposition 4 below and its corollary provide an encouraging answer.
For an element R of the form (2.12) we define it’s magnitude as
‖R‖ = max{|n1|, |n2|, |n3|, |n4|, |n5|, |n6|}.
Proposition 4. The rate of increase of the magnitude ‖RαA‖ in N is sub-
linear: there λ > 0 such that ‖RαA‖ ≤ λN, where N is the length of the
sequence A.
The proof of this assertion is provided in the next section.
Now we formulate only a corollary of Proposition 4, which is directly relevant
to computational hardship of calculating the sets SN (Rα) and S
bal
N (Rα) for large
N . For a given set S we denote by #S the number of elements in this set.
Corollary 2. The estimates
#SN (Rα) ≤ µN
6, #SbalN (Rα) ≤ µbalN
3,
where µ, µbal are some positive constant, hold.
On the basis of this corollary, we expect the analysis of the set SN (Rα) is
doable for N of the order of 100.
We note another unexpected feature or the Arbiter ’s power. One can expect
that sufficiently long and sufficiently “diverse” sequences (2.9) should result in
achieving balanced rates. The following proposition shows that this is wrong.
Proposition 5. There exist a chain of 32 arbitrages, which contains all 24 ar-
bitrages from Table 1 (and all arbitrages are active), such that the corresponding
chain (2.9) is periodic after a transient part. This chain is given by
5 7 17 5 14 12 15 18 11 4 18 6 10 3 8 20
19 1 23 19 14 22 9 24 21 14 24 20 16 13 2 6;
here, for brevity, we listed the numbers of arbitrages from Table 1, instead of
the arbitrages themselves.
To conclude this subsection, we note that the set S(Rα) is, in contrast to
(2.17), much smaller than the totality Tα of all ensembles of the form (2.12). In
particular, the following assertion holds.
Proposition 6. The set S(Rα) does not contain the six-tuples
Rαn = (α
nr¯FA, r¯FR, r¯FM , r¯A,R, r¯AM , r¯RM )
for n 6= −1, 0, 1.
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2.5 Tables
Table 1: List of arbitrages
Number Arbitrage Activation condition Actions
1 AFAR
rFR
rAR
> rFA r
new
FA =
rFR
rAR
2 AFAM
rFM
rAM
> rFA r
new
FA =
rFM
rAM
3 AFRA rFA · rAR > rFR r
new
FR = rFA · rAR
4 AFRM
rFM
rRM
> rFR r
new
FR =
rFM
rMR
5 AFMA rFA · rAM > rFM r
new
FM = rFA · rAM
6 AFMR rFR · rRM > rFM r
new
FM = rFR · rRM
7 AAFR
rFR
rAR
< rFA r
new
FA =
rFR
rAR
8 AAFM
rFM
rAM
< rFA r
new
FA =
rFM
rAM
9 AARF
rFR
rFA
> rAR r
new
AR =
rFR
rAF
10 AARM
rAM
rMR
> rAR r
new
AR =
rAM
rMR
11 AAMF
rFM
rAF
> rAM r
new
AM =
rFM
rAF
12 AAMR rAR · rRM > rAM r
new
AM = rAR · rRM
13 ARFA rFA · rAR < rFR r
new
FR = rFA · rAR
14 ARFM
rFM
rRM
< rFR r
new
FR =
rFM
rMR
15 ARAF
rFR
rAF
< rAR r
new
AR =
rFR
rAF
16 ARAM
rAM
rMR
< rAR r
new
AR =
rAM
rMR
17 ARMF
rFM
rFR
> rRM r
new
RM =
rFM
rFR
18 ARMA
rAM
rAR
> rRM r
new
RM =
rAM
rAR
19 AMFA rFA · rAM < rFM r
new
FM = rFA · rAM
20 AMFR rFR · rRM < rFM r
new
F,M = rFR · rRM
21 AMAF
rFM
rAF
< rAM r
new
AM =
rFM
rAF
22 AMAR rAR · rRM < rAM r
new
AM = rAR · rRM
23 AMRF
rFM
rFR
< rRM r
new
RM =
rFM
rFR
24 AMRA
rAM
rAR
< rRM r
new
RM =
rAM
rAR
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Table 2: Optimal chains of (strong) arbitrages to reach 27 balanced
ensembles with the codes (i, j, k) satisfying |i|, |j|, |k| ≤ 1
Number Strategy’s
length
Balanced
outcome’s
code
Optimal sequence of strong arbitrages
1 1 (0, 0, 0) 2
2 2 (1,−1, 0) 7, 10
3 2 (1, 1, 0) 3, 6
4 3 (1,−1, 1) 5, 7, 12
5 3 (1, 0,−1) 3, 9, 12
6 4 (0,−1, 1) 7, 2, 3, 12
7 4 (0, 0,−1) 9, 1, 5, 12
8 4 (0, 0, 1) 5, 1, 9, 12
9 4 (0, 1,−1) 3, 2, 7, 12
10 5 (0,−1, 0) 7, 2, 3, 6, 10
11 5 (0, 1, 0) 3, 2, 6, 7, 10
12 5 (1,−1,−1) 9, 12, 6, 7, 10
13 5 (1, 0, 1) 5, 11, 3, 6, 10
14 5 (−1, 1,−1) 3, 11, 5, 4, 8
15 6 (−1, 0, 0) 9, 1, 5, 4, 1, 10
16 6 (−1, 1, 0) 3, 2, 7, 4, 1, 10
17 7 (−1,−1, 1) 7, 2, 3, 6, 2, 3, 12
18 7 (−1, 0,−1) 9, 1, 5, 4, 1, 5, 12
19 7 (−1, 0, 1) 7, 2, 3, 8, 1, 9, 12
20 7 (−1, 1,−1) 9, 1, 5, 10, 2, 7, 12
21 7 (−1, 1, 1) 5, 1, 9, 8, 1, 9, 12
22 8 (−1,−1, 0) 7, 2, 3, 6, 2, 3, 6, 10
23 8 (0,−1,−1) 9, 1, 5, 4, 12, 6, 7, 10
24 8 (0, 1, 1) 3, 2, 6, 9, 12, 6, 7, 10
25 8 (1, 1, 0) 3, 11, 5, 4, 12, 6, 7, 10
26 11 (−1,−1,−1) 9, 1, 5, 4, 1, 5, 4, 12, 6, 7, 10
27 11 (1, 1, 1) 3, 11, 5, 4, 12, 6, 9, 12, 6, 7, 10
3 Mathematical Background
3.1 Reformulation in the Linear Algebra Terms
Analysis of sequences of arbitrages in FARM -economy admits an elegant geo-
metric interpretation, to be discussed in this section. Actually, we have used
heavily this interpretation when inventing and proving results from Subsection
2.4 (although many proves can be eventually rewritten without explicit refer-
ences to the geometrical interpretation). We also feel that this interpretation
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will be useful in understanding more complicated, and more realistic, mathe-
matical models in economics.
We use, as an auxiliary tool, a somehow stronger arbitrage procedure. Let
us begin with an example. Consider the combination (FAM). For a given R
we define the Strong Arbitrage Aˆ(FAM)R as AFAM if the inequality (2.8) holds,
and as AAFM , otherwise. Note that in both cases the result in terms of principal
rates is the same: the rate rFA is changed to r
new
FA =
rFM
rAM
.
The strong arbitrage Aˆ(FAM) is the second entry in Table 3 of the possible
12 strong arbitrages. The meaning of a strong arbitrage is simple. This is just
balancing a corresponding “sub-economy” (FAM) by changing the exchange
rate for a pair F ⇆ A.
Table 3: Strong arbitrages
Number Strong arbitrage Action
1 AˆFAR r
new
FA =
rFR
rAR
2 AˆFAM r
new
FR =
rFM
rAM
3 AˆFRA r
new
FR = rF,A · rAR
4 AˆFRM r
new
FR =
rFM
rRM
5 AˆFMA r
new
FM = rF,A · rAM
6 AˆFMR r
new
FM = rFR · rRM
7 AˆARF r
new
AR =
rFR
rFA
8 AˆARM r
new
AR =
rAM
rRM
9 AˆAMF r
new
AM =
rFM
rFA
10 AˆAMR r
new
AM = rAR · rRM
11 AˆRMF r
new
RM =
rFM
rFR
12 AˆRMA r
new
RM =
rAM
rAR
Proposition 7. For any sequence of arbitrages (2.9) and any initial exchange
rates R there exist a chain Aˆ = Aˆ1 . . . Aˆn of strong arbitrages, such that RAˆ =
RA. Conversely, for any chain Aˆ = Aˆ1 . . . Aˆn of strong arbitrages and any
initial exchange rates R there exist a sequence of arbitrages, such that RAˆ = RA.
This proposition reduces investigation of the questions from the previous
subsection to investigation of analogous questions related to sequences of strong
arbitrages.
We define a correspondence to ensemble
R = (rFA, rFR, rFM , rAR, rAM , rRM )
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of principal exchange rates, and a column vector v = v(R) ∈ R6 via the following
procedure
v(R) =
(
v(1), v(2), v(3), v(4), v(5), v(6)
)
= (log rFA, log rAR, log rRM , log rFR, log rAM , log rFM ) .
Now we relate a strong arbitrage, which has number n in Table 3, a 6 × 6
matrix Bn, n = 1, . . . , 12, as follows:
B1 =


0 0 0 0 0 0
−1 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1


, B2 =


0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
−1 0 0 0 1 0
1 0 0 0 0 1


,
B3 =


1 0 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1


, B4 =


1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 −1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1 0 1


,
B5 =


1 0 0 0 0 1
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0


, B6 =


1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 1
0 0 0 1 0 1
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0


,
B7 =


1 −1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
0 1 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1


, B8 =


1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 −1 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1


,
B9 =


1 0 0 0 −1 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 1


, B10 =


1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 1 0
0 0 1 0 1 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1


,
B11 =


1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 −1 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 1 0 0 1


, B12 =


1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 −1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1


.
We denote by B the ensemble of these matrices.
Proposition 8. For any strong arbitrage Aˆ with number k in Table 3, and any
ensemble R the equality v(RAˆ) = v(R)Bk holds.
Corollary 3. For any chain Aˆ = Aˆ1 . . . Aˆn of strong arbitrages the relationship
v(RˆA) = v(R)
n∏
i=1
Bk(i)
holds, where k(i) is the number of Arbitrage Ai, i = 1, . . . , n. In particular for
an initial state of the form (2.10), the vector v(Rα)Aˆ may be written as
v(R¯α) + (logα)v
n∏
i=1
Bk(i),
where v = (1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) .
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This proposition reduces analysis of sequences of strong arbitrages to analysis
of products of matrices B.
3.2 A Special Coordinate System
Proposition 1 implies
Corollary 4. The matrices Bi, i = 1, . . . , 12, have a common invariant sub-
space defined by
v(1) + v(2) = v(4),
v(2) + v(3) = v(5),
v(1) + v(2) + v(3) = v(6).
By this corollary there exists a substitution of variables Q, such that each
matrix QBnQ
−1 has the block-triangular form:
Dn := Q
−1BnQ =
(
I 0
Fn Gn
)
, n = 1, . . . , 12.
Here the matrices Q and Q−1 may be chosen as follows:
Q =


1 0 0 1 0 1
0 1 0 1 1 1
0 0 1 0 1 1
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1


, Q
−1 =


1 0 0 −1 0 −1
0 1 0 −1 −1 −1
0 0 1 0 −1 −1
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1


.
In the new coordinates the matrices Dn := Q
−1BnQ take the form:
D1 =


1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 −1
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1


, D2 =


1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
−1 0 0 1 1 1
1 0 0 −1 0 0


,
D3 =


1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1


, D4 =


1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1 0 1


,
D5 =


1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0


, D6 =


1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 1
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0


,
D7 =


1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 −1 −1
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1


, D8 =


1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 −1 0 −1
0 0 0 0 0 1


,
D9 =


1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 00
0 0 0 0 1 1


, D10 =


1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1


,
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D11 =


1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 −1 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 1 0 −1 0


, D12 =


1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 −1
0 0 0 0 0 1


.
3.3 Key Graph of FARM -economy
The South-East blocks Gn, are the following:
G1 =


0 0 −1
0 1 0
0 0 1

 , G2 =


1 0 0
1 1 1
−1 0 0

 , G3 =


0 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 1

 ,
G4 =


0 0 0
0 1 0
1 0 1

 , G5 =


1 0 0
0 1 1
0 0 0

 , G6 =


1 0 1
0 1 0
0 0 0

 ,
G7 =


0 −1 −1
0 1 0
0 0 1

 , G8 =


1 0 0
−1 0 −1
0 0 1

 , G9 =


1 0 0
0 0 0
0 1 1

 ,
G10 =


1 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 1

 , G11 =


1 1 1
0 1 0
0 −1 0

 , G12 =


1 0 0
0 0 −1
0 0 1

 .
Denote by S the set of vectors which are mapped to zero by at least one of
the matrices Gn. By inspection these are the vectors proportional to one of the
following six vectors:
s1 = (1, 0, 1) , s2 = (1, 0, 0) , s3 = (0, 0, 1) ,
s4 = (1, 1, 1) , s5 = (0, 1, 0) , s6 = (0, 1, 1) .
By definition the set {±s1,±s2,±s3,±s4,±s5,±s6} is transformed by any
matrix Gn into itself. The graph of the corresponding transitions (see Fig. 1) is
essential for understanding our problem, and we call it the key graph of FARM-
economy.
Ignoring the zero vertex and the edge labels, this graph is isomorphic to the
polyhedral octahedron graph, see Fig. 2.
3.4 Consequences
By inspection, the set P = co {±s1,±s2,±s3,±s4,±s5,±s6} has a non-empty
interior. It is a polyhedron, with six quadrilateral and eight triangular faces.
This polyhedron is a usual (a little bit elongated) triangular orthobicupola,
shown at Fig. 3.
We can consider this polyhedron P as the unit ball in an auxiliary norm
‖ · ‖∗, in which ‖Gn‖∗ ≤ 1, n = 1, 2, . . . , 12. Thus, the set of matrices {Gn} is
neutrally stable.
This implies that any product of matrices D, and therefore any product
of matrices B has only eigenvectors which are equal either to 0 or to 1. In
particular the spectral radius of any product is equal to 1. This proves both
Proposition 6 and Proposition 4.
Now we present two interesting types of sequences of strong arbitrages, that
appeared to be useful.
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0±s1
±s2
±s3
±s4
±s5
±s6
←
1, 2
4
→
←
3
4
6
8
10
11
12
6→
← 5
8
→
←
7
10
→
←
9
1
→
←
2
2
5
8
9
10
12
3, 4
→
8
→
←
7
11→
←
12
1,3,7,8,1 0,12
5
,
6
→
10
→
←
9
11→
←
12
1
→
←
2
2,4,5,6,9,11
←
7
,
8
4
→
←
3
1
3
4
6
7
11
6→
← 5
←
9, 10
1
2
3
5
7
9
11, 1
2 →
Figure 1: Graph of transitions between the points ±si under different strong
arbitrages.
s1
s2
s3
s6
s5
s4
s
s
6
5
4
3 2
1
s
s
s
s
Figure 2: The octahedron graph
The sequence is Aˆ is called stabilizer, if for any R the corresponding outcome
AˆR is balanced. For example, the chain
Aˆ = AAMRAFRAAFMR
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s1
s6 s4
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−s5
−s2
−s6−s4
−s1
−s3
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z
y
s2
s1
s6 s4
−s2
−s6−s4
−s1
x
z
y
s3
−s5
Figure 3: The polyhedron P.
is a stabilizer.
By definition the following assertion holds.
Lemma 1. The chain of arbitrages is a stabilizer if and only if the product of
the corresponding sequence of matrices G is equal to zero.
By Aˆp we denote concatenation of p exemplars of Aˆ. For example, if Aˆ =
AAMR, AFRA, then
Aˆ3 = AAMRAFRAAAMRAFRAAAMRAFRA.
The chain Aˆ is called destabilizer, if for some R all elements
RAˆp, p = 1, 2, . . . ,
are pair-wise different.
Lemma 2. The sequence of arbitrages is a destabilizer if and only if the product
of the corresponding sequence of matrices D is equal an adjoint vector for the
eigenvalue 1.
Follows from definitions.
The last two lemmas have been used in construction of the sequence from
Proposition 3 in the following way. First, we have chosen a destabilizer given
by the following chain of strong arbitrages:
Aˆ = AFRMAFMRARMA.
Secondly, we multiplied it by the stabilizer
Aˆ = AAMRAFRAAFMR.
Thirdly, we have produced the corresponding sequence of arbitrages. Finally,
we found, that in our particular case this “stabilizing” part can be reduced to
AFMA.
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3.5 Links to the Asynchronous Systems Theory
In conclusion, we make three remarks which could be useful in investigation of
systems with more than four producers.
• Construction of matrices Bn may be interpreted as a special case of con-
struction of mixtures of matrices in the asynchronous systems theory
(see [1] or a short survey [5]). Convergence analysis for the product of
matrices B is analogous to analysis of absolute r-asymptotic stability of
asynchronous system. This problem is also similar to the problem of es-
timating the generalized (joint) spectral radius of a family of matrices
consisting of all matrices Bn.
• Since the matrices G are integer, the convergence of long regular sequences
to zero is similar to the well known mortality problem (see [2–4, 8]).
• In the case of matrices G, the subspace of common fixed points of these
matrices is trivial. Moreover, this set of matrices is irreducible: they do not
have common invariant subspaces. Following [6,7] one can find an explicit
estimate for norms of all products of matrices from irreducible family.
Furthermore, if all entries of the matrices are integer, the question whether
any sufficiently long product would equal to zero is algorithmically solvable
in a finite (may be very large, but still finite) number of operations.
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